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Abstract 
Although recent economics contributions represent important strides 
forward in the understanding of leadership behavior, the cognitive 
and symbolic dimensions of the phenomenon have attracted 
virtually no interests from economists and game theorists.  I argue 
that an understanding of these dimensions may be founded on 
coordination games, particularly to the extent that these illustrate 
interactive belief formation. In this context, leadership is defined as 
the taking of actions that coordinate the complementary actions of 
many people through the creation of belief conditions that (at least) 
substitute for common knowledge, and where these actions 
characteristically consists of some act of communication directed at 
those being led.  The concept of common knowledge (or, its 
approximation by means of notions of common belief) is argued to 
be particularly important to understanding leadership.  Thus, leaders 
may establish common knowledge conditions, and assist the 
coordination of strategies in this way, or make decisions in situations 
where coordination problems persist in spite of common knowledge. 
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 1. Introduction 
Why are major organizational restructurings often communicated through large-
scale gatherings where top-management addresses employees through face-to-face 
contact instead of relying on, for example, electronic mail? Why do many 
corporations spend substantial amounts of money on flying in managers from 
foreign subsidiaries to tell them things in personal meetings with top-management 
that they could easily be told over the telephone, fax or e-mail?  More generally, 
why are executives so fond of face-to-face, verbal communication, when in many 
situations written communication or others means of communication would 
appear to be relevant substitutes?1
 The described phenomena may seem to be ritualistic and ceremonial, perhaps 
only given to explanation in terms of group-psychology or the desire to achieve 
legitimacy through conforming to institutional requirements, etc.  For such 
reasons, it may be argued that they lie outside the orbit of “rational” social science.  
However, it will be argued in this paper that simple ideas from (mostly) game 
theory suggest a rational explanation.   More specifically, the hypothesis here is 
that the above phenomena are manifestations of the exercise of leadership designed 
to coordinate the complementary actions of many people through the creation of belief 
conditions that (at least) approximate common knowledge.2  Indeed, the overall 
argument is that leadership, coordination, and common beliefs/knowledge are 
closely related phenomena, and that leadership is a prominent member of the set 
of “alternative institutions for resolving coordination problems” (Cooper, DeJong, 
Forsythe and Ross 1994).  The argument is developed using simple ideas from non-
cooperative game theory on coordination games, and on exploring these ideas 
from a decision-theoretic point of view; hence, the emphasis on the epistemic states 
of players.  
 As an academic subject, leadership is characterized by huge differences with 
respect to the basic conceptualization of the phenomenon. No doubt this is because 
many disciplines have contributed to the study of leadership and because  
leadership behavior is manifest in many diverse social settings.  It is therefore 
advisable to be explicit about what is meant by leadership.  And the literature on 
leadership has in general heeded such advise: Even a casual reading of the 
literature reveals that it is very rich indeed with respect to providing 
                                                 
1 A phenomenon that has been noted repeatedly in the literature on executive behavior at least 
since Carlsson (1951). 
2 An event is common knowledge among a group of players if each player knows it, each one 
knows that the other players know it, each player knows that other players know that the other 
players know it and so on.  For splendid non-technical discussions of common knowledge, see 
Geanakoplos (1992) and Bicchieri (1993).  Common knowledge was introduced by Lewis (1969) and 
formalized by Aumann (1976).  The link between firm organization and common knowledge is 
stressed by Cremer (1990).  
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conceptualizations.3 In fact, it is much richer in this respect than with respect to 
providing explanations of the phenomenon.  
 In this paper I define leadership as the ability to resolve coordination problems by 
influencing beliefs. This is both a conceptualization and a stab at an explanation.  For 
some reason, the leader is able to spot and resolve coordination problems by 
influencing beliefs more effectively than other people.  For example, the leader 
may have priviliged information about some state of nature that perturbs the 
underlying game.  Because, as will often be the case in practice, the leader’s own 
pay-offs are somehow tied to the pay-offs of his followers (and they know this), 
they are actually prepared to believe and follow him.   The leader’s announcement 
of what strategy should be followed is effective in resolving the underlying 
coordination problem because it creates a belief structure that at least 
approximates common knowledge.  It is well-known from the literatures on 
conventions, focal points, the robustness of game theoretical equilibria, etc. that 
whether common knowledge obtains or not may, the extent to which it is 
approximated by beliefs, etc. may make crucial differences for outcomes (e.g., 
Rubinstein 1989; Monderer and Samet 1989; Crawford and Haller 1990).  
 This overall explanation arguably grasps much ⎯ if certainly not all ⎯ of 
what is meant by leadership, both in common parlance and in the scholarly 
literature.  Because the emphasis is on the coordination of beliefs (e.g., of people 
in an organization), it is appropriate to make use of a particular class of games, 
namely coordination games.  Indeed, the paper may be read as a contribution to a 
small but growing literature that tries to cast organizational phenomena in terms of 
resolving interaction problems that can be represented by various types of 
coordination games (notably Camerer and Knez 1994, 1996, 1997; Greenan and 
Guellec 1994; Weber 1998).4  However, this literature has not dealt with leadership. 
Another important source of inspiration is political science contributions on 
leadership (notably, Calvert 1992, 1995; Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young 1971; 
Hardin 1982) which clearly identifies a link between leadership and coordination 
problems (particularly Calvert 1992), but without using the epistemic arguments 
presented in this paper.  
 The design of the paper is the following. First comes a rather selective 
literature review.  Instead of reviewing the enormous and diverse literature on 
leadership, I concentrate briefly on the few economics approaches to leadership.  I 
then argue that a different approach to leadership may be developed ⎯ one that 
both retains a rational choice orientation and links up with those contributions to 
the leadership literature that has stressed the cognitive aspects of leadership, that 
                                                 
3 House and Baetz’ (1979) early survey listed over 70 definitions of leadership, and Rost (1991) lists 
221 different definitions. 
4  On a broader level, it links up with the general expansion of interest in coordination games 
during the last decade or so (e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990, 1991; Bicchieri 1993; Colman 
1997; Colman and Bacharach 1998; Cooper and John 1988; Cooper 1999; Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe 
and Ross 1992, 1994;  Crawford and Haller 1990; Galesloot and Goyal 1997; Kramarz 1996;  Sugden 
1995).  
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is, how leaders influence what people believe.  I then continue with presenting 
some basic game theory ideas.  Even on an elementary level we can make the basic 
point that coordination games aren’t trivial, somewhat contrary to common 
perception, and that they are likely to capture the essence of a large number of real-
world situations.  Notably, they are likely to help us gain an improved 
understanding of important aspects of leadership.  What is offered in the following 
pages is not a finely honed theory about leadership behavior (as in Hermalin 1998).  
Rather, it is an explorative discussion (somewhat in the style of Kreps 1990a and 
Langlois 1998), aiming at convinving organizational scholars of the value of basic 
game theoretic ideas and economists of organization of the possibility of 
alternative routes of research. 
  
2. Leadership: A (Very) Partial Literature Review 
Webster’s dictionary defines leadership as “leading others along a way, guiding.”  
There are clearly two distinct aspects involved in the exercise of leadership, 
namely, first, selecting a goal, and, second, making others follow that goal 
(Gardner 1990: 11).   From the perspective of the economics of organization, “… the 
problem of motivating employees to follow a vision is the standard agency 
problem” (Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman 1996: 309).   In the following, I shall 
briefly discuss a few contributions that work out of a similar logic, and then 
suggest the possibility of an alternative view that while it is consistent with a 
rational choice approach puts more stress on cognition and belief formation than 
on motivation per se.  
Some Recent Economics Contributions 
 That social interaction problems and leadership are somehow connected is 
not a new recognition in social science research per se.  At least, political scientists 
have often made the link explicit (Calvert 1992, 1995; Frohlich, Oppenheimer and 
Young 1971; Hardin 1982).  In contrast, economists have had relatively little to say 
about leadership, and when they have addressed the issue, it fair to say that one 
specific modeling heuristic has been dominant. To see this, consider three 
important economics contributions to the leadership literature, namely Kreps 
(1990), Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) and Hermalin (1998).  All three work out of 
contract economics approaches. Thus, Kreps and Rotemberg and Saloner begin 
from an incomplete contract setting, whereas Hermalin takes his starting point in 
the Holmström (1982) (complete contracts) team-model.  Consider each one of 
these in turn. 
 Strictly speaking, Kreps’ paper is not about leadership per se, but rather about 
corporate culture, and how the reputation that a corporate culture may help build 
provides an important part of the explanation of firm organization.  Nevertheless, 
it certainly makes provision for leadership.  Beginning from the property 
rights/incomplete contracts theory (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995), Kreps 
argues that incompleteness of contracts may produce a need for implicit contracts. 
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However, in the face of unforeseen contingencies, it is not clear how implicit 
contracts should be administered; in particular, it is not clear how well standard 
reputation arguments work with unforeseen contingencies. The possible role of 
leadership in this setting is to provide general principles (i.e., focal points) that 
instructs employees and suppliers about how unforeseen contingencies will be 
handled in the future by management  (see also Shleifer and Summers 1990).  
 Rotemberg and Saloner are more taken up with how leadership styles are 
influenced by environmental contingencies.  However, the same basic insights as in 
Kreps ⎯ namely, that the provision of incentives is not straightforward under 
incomplete contracting ⎯ plays a key role in their paper.  Specifically, they 
consider the problem of compensating middle managers who develop project 
ideas, when compensation cannot be based on the manager’s unobservable effort 
but has to be based on whether the project is implemented, and where the CEO 
may have difficulties committing to implementation; hence, contracting is 
incomplete and commitment is imperfect. Leadership style affects employees’ 
beliefs about how they will be compensated in various circumstances. Assuming 
that shareholders will select the firm’s leadership style to maximize profits, they 
will appoint “empathic” leaders (whose utility functions include the utility of their 
manager) if the firm operates in an opportunity-rich environment, whereas 
“selfish” leaders (whose utility functions do include the utility of their managers) 
will be appointed in stable environments.  
 Finally, Hermalin studies incentive problems in the context of the team model 
of Holmström (1982). The problem here is that the leader for some reason has 
privileged information about what the team should do, but ⎯ because she shares 
in team output ⎯ has an incentive to exaggerate the value of effort devoted to the 
common activity.  In Hermalin’s main case the problem may be solved if the leader 
acts as a Stackelberg leader and expends effort earlier than the other team 
members.  Based on their observation of effort, the other team members form 
beliefs about the leader’s information.  Interestingly, this produces the conclusion 
that the leader works harder than she would do under symmetric information.  
The leader indeed “leads by example.” 
 To be sure, these modeling efforts are neat, logical and produce interesting, 
sometimes counterintuitive, conclusions.  However, they are limited in various 
ways that are typical of recent contract economics. The basic thrust of this literature 
is to conceptualize virtually any issue related to economic organization in terms of 
solving incentive-conflicts.5  The motivation for this presumably is an underlying 
argument that in the absence of such conflicts, the first-best can be reached without 
                                                 
5  ”Any” should be taken quite literally (see Langlois and Foss 1999 for some examples).  Although 
some contract theorists note that there are other problems of economic organization than incentive 
conflicts, little more than lip service is normally being paid to these problems (the exception being 
the team theory literature, cf. Radner 1986).  For example, although Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 
114) point out that ”[t]he key role of management in organization is to ensure coordination,” and 
their book stand out as offering comparatively much attention to coordination issues, its main 
thrust nevertheless is on incentive issues.  
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major obstacles (e.g., Hart 1995).  Thus, the essence of the above contributions is 
that (business) leaders exist because they resolve incentive conflicts, albeit 
sophisticated and non-standard ones.  However, other perspectives on leadership 
are certainly possible, and insights from related disciplines are likely to enrichen 
economic approaches to leadership.6
Towards a Different View 
 The view that all, or most, organizational phenomena are reducible to 
problems of aligning incentives is one that is implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) 
contradicted by contributions to organization studies (Thompson 1967), the 
executive and leadership literature (Barnard 1948; Carlsson 1951; Kotter 1996; 
Selznick 1957), political science (Calvert 1992, 1995), (rational choice) sociology 
(Coleman 1990), and in some quarters of the economics of organization (Camerer 
and Knez 1994, 1996, 1997; Langlois 1998; Langlois and Foss 1999; Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992: chapter 4; Weber 1998).   Many of these contributions are directly 
relevant to the issue of leadership. 
 For example, Coleman (1990) observes that charismatic authority may be a 
response to coordination problems that don’t necessarily turn on misaligned 
incentives (see also Langlois 1998).  In fact, Coleman’s discussion suggests that he 
has an assurance game in mind.7  Camerer and Knez (1994, 1996, 1997) and Calvert 
(1992, 1995) argue that attention should be shifted to coordination games (rather 
than cooperation games) in seeking a foundation for the understanding of 
organizational phenomena. Although he has placed primary emphasis on 
problems of ex post opportunism, Williamson (1991: 278) has not been blind to the 
possibility of coordination problems, noting that failures of coordination “… may 
arise because autonomous parties read and react to signals differently, even 
though their purpose is to achieve a timely and compatible combined response.”  
While making much room for the role of incentives in organization, Chester 
Barnard also emphasized the importance of “the inculcation of belief in the real 
existence of a common purpose”, which he considered to be “an essential executive 
                                                 
6 In fact, in a recent contribution, political scientist Gary Miller (1992) urges economists of 
organization to take a closer look at what political scientists have to say about leadership.  This is 
because much of the literature on political economy may serve both as an important bridge 
between the behavioral and the economics views of hierarchy and as a source of new insights.  In 
spite of this, Miller’s own treatment is strikingly economistic.  Thus, he only discusses leadership in 
the context of the incentive conflict problems that are the main focus of interest in the mainstream 
economics literature on organization. 
7 An assurance (or, ”stag-hunt”) game may be exemplified by the following game: There are n 
players that have to choose among 2 strategies, Risky and Safe.  Safe yields some fixed pay-off y ∈ 
(0, 1), whereas Risky yields 1 if at least ρ players choose it and 0 otherwise. This game has two 
Nash equilibria in pure strategies (all choose Risky and all choose Safe).   An generalization of 
assurance games is represented by weak-link or minimum effort coordination games, in which, for 
example, a group choose numbers and the group pay-off depends on the lowest number selected 
by any player.  See Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) for a classic experimental study of weakest-
link games, Camerer and Knez (1994) for an application of such games to the ”expectational assets” 
and Weber (1998) for an application to firm growth.    
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function” (Barnard 1948: 87).   Indeed, he very clearly argued that an “… an 
organization can secure the efforts necessary to its existence … either by the 
objective inducements it provides or by changing states of mind” (idem.: 141; my 
emphasis).    
 The aim of the following pages is to develop some of these suggestions.  
Thus, in line with Camerer and Knez (1994, 1996, 1997), Weber (1998) and Calvert 
(1992, 1995), the focus is on coordination games rather than on cooperation games.   
And in line with Barnard, and others who have stressed the cognitive aspects of 
leadership (e.g., Selznick 1957), the emphasis will be on “the inculcation of belief” 
and on “changing states of mind,” for example, through (credible) communication.  
In contrast, all incentive problems will be suppressed.  Basic game theory ideas 
will be used to explicate the reasoning.   
 
3. Coordination Problems and Coordination Games 
 
Cooperation and Coordination Games 
 Criticism of the predominant incentive-alignment heuristic in the economics 
of organization has often been cast in terms of basic game theory (e.g., Camerer 
and Knez 1994, 1996, 1997; Foss 1996).  Thus, the critics have argued that all 
emphasis has been on cooperation games, that is, games where the pay-off space of 
the game is such that the efficient outcomes are not supportable as equilibria (at 
least in one-shot play).  The key problem that such a game leads one to ponder is 
how to avoid the Pareto-inferior outcome.  Indeed, the basic hold-up situation has 
a prisoners’ dilemma structure (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 128), and this is also 
the case with the team production problem and other problems with information 
externalities and moral hazard (Holmström 1982, 1999).  Accordingly, the literature 
is taken up with how re-allocating incentives and property rights may improve on 
outcomes.   In contrast, the economics of organization literature is characterized by 
a corresponding lack of interest in the interaction problems that may be 
represented by coordination games ⎯ a somewhat surprising neglect given the the 
increasing emphasis on such problems in other areas of economics, such as 
standards (Farrell and Saloner 1985; Witt 1997), conventions (Young 1996), learning 
behavior (Crawford and Haller 1990), and macroeconomics (Cooper 1999) 
(Friedman 1994).8    
 Conventionally, there is a distinction between shared interest (or “pure”) 
coordination games and coordination games with mixed interests.  In the former 
category, players’ preferences over equilibria coincide.  In symmetric shared 
interest coordination games, all equilibria are efficient and pay-off equivalent, so 
that players are indifferent about which equilibrium is chosen, as long as one is in 
fact chosen.  The coordination problem in question concerns actually choosing an 
equilibrium (Bicchieri 1993). In contrast, non-symmetric shared interests 
                                                 
8 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for stressing this. 
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coordination games, exhibit multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria.  This (sub-) 
category encompasses assurance games where the coordination problem is caused 
by the riskiness of coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium (Cooper 1999).   
While coordination games with mixed interests will also exhibit multiple equilibria, 
these equilibria are ranked differently by the players (cf. the battle of the sexes or 
the chicken games), so that the problem again is choosing one of the equilibria. In 
the present paper, reference will mostly be to shared interest coordination games.9  
Coordination Problems and Approaches to Organizational Phenomena 
 Much recent work in game theory has consisted in refining a number of 
equilibrium concepts, most of them variations on the basic notion of Nash 
equilibrium.  In general, the refinement literature analyzes alternative equilibrium 
concepts in terms of the epistemic states of players, that is, what they know or 
believe about other players’s beliefs, knowledge, rationality, etc., and about the 
game (Aumann and Brandenburger 1995).  Thus, the literature has a strong 
decision-theoretic, even “subjectivist,”10 orientation. Complicated interactive 
epistemics is involved, and impressive reasoning skills are imputed to players.  
Critics may easily gain the impression that classical game theory solves the 
coordination problem by defining it away, that is to say, by assuming that agents 
by means of pure ratiocination can reason their way to equilibrium.11  And such 
critics may argue that the literature begins from what is basically an existence 
claim, namely that if rational players have commonly known and identical beliefs 
about all other players’ strategies, then those beliefs are consistent with some 
equilibrium in the game.  A problem with this is that nothing is said about the 
origin and formation of beliefs, and it is in principle possible that although there is 
an equilibrium in players’ strategies, they may never be able to realize that 
equilibrium.12   
 Along the lines of classical game theory, most of today’s formal economics of 
organization proceeds on the assumption that players can choose the efficient game-
form for regulating their trade and can also choose any desired equilibrium 
thereof.13 It is a story of unproblematic coordination, given the constraints.  
                                                 
9  This is certainly not to say that leadership is irrelevant to the problem of selecting equilibria in 
mixed-motives games.  Howeever, for the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to go into these 
games. 
10 Thus, much of the basic thrust of the literature is reminiscent of Hayek (1937) and Richardson 
(1960) ⎯ seminal contributions that ought to be recognized as important, early contributions to 
game theory.   
11 The exception to this rationalistic approach is, of course, constituted by evolutionary game 
theory.   
12 Clearly, simply proceeding by eliminating equilibria by means of various refinement procedures 
will not do; we still need to rationalize the emergence of beliefs that can sustain the final 
equilibrium.   
13 This is the case of the standard principal-agent type analysis of compensation schemes (Salanié 
1997), for the analysis of implicit contracts in long-term relationships, and also for the incomplete 
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Although information asymmetries and conflicting incentives may hinder reaching 
the first-best outcome, there is no problem picking the equilibrium that is induced 
by these constraints (and the rationality of the players, etc.).  In this literature, one 
does not encounter, say, two pay-off equivalent second-best outcomes, with 
players confronting the coordination problem of choosing between the two.  Such 
problem are defined away.  Of course, this is a shortcut to conceptualizing various 
contractual arrangements as equilibria of some properly specified underlying 
games, involving conflicting incentives, and it may be argued that suppressing 
coordination problems is justified because it allows to concentrate on the essentials 
(but see Foss and Foss 2000). Moreover, it may be claimed that coordination 
problems are in fact not suppressed in the formal economics of organization, since 
the whole point of these exercises is to show how agents may coordinate to avoid 
inefficiency, or at least reach the second best.  However, something different is 
involved here.   More specifically, the argument is that organizations, and leaders, 
do more than making agents avoid inefficiencies in prisoners’ dilemma-like 
interaction situations. For example, a proponent of institutional organization 
theory may argue that a function of organization is to define what strategies are 
available, in the sense of being “legitimate”relative to some environment (Powell 
and DiMaggio 1991).  An entrepreneurship scholar may point out that the function 
of leadership is to alert to be new business opportunities. Although placing 
primary emphasis on the hold-up problem, Williamson (1985, 1996, 1998) has long 
argued ⎯ following a time-honoured tradition in organization theory (March and 
Simon 1958) ⎯ that an organization also serves the purpose of alleviating bounds 
on rationality.  
 To be sure, it is hard to make game-theoretic sense of such functions of 
organization and leadership. For example, if the leader’s function lie in his 
“defining new strategies,” this amounts to introducing a new game, and it is not at 
all clear what is gained by comparing a string of different games.  However, more 
unconventional ideas (relative to economics) on “symbolic leadership”, the leader’s 
“the inculcation of belief” among those being led, etc. can in fact be treated in 
relatively simple game-theoretic terms.  Camerer and Knez (1994, 1996, 1997) and 
Weber (1998) have already demonstrated the usefulness of a coordination game 
perspective  for understanding a host of organizational phenomena.  The following 
may be taken as an extension of the basic thrust of their arguments to the 
phenomenon of leadership in organizations.   To understand the argument, it is, 
however, necessary to spend some time arguing that, somewhat contrary to 
common perception, coordination games are non-trivial and quite fundamental.  
Coordination Games are Non-Trivial and Fundamental  
 The dominant implicit attitude among social scientists appears, at least until 
recently, to have been that coordination games, particularly of the shared interests 
                                                                                                                                                     
contract type of concern with the sharing of joint surplus and how this influences the choice of 
ownership arrangements (Grossman and Hart 1986). 
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type, are basically trivial.14  The sources of this attitude are hard to trace, but the 
verdict issued in R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa’s (1957: 59) very influential 
book, Games and Decisions that at least in pure coordination games ”everything is 
trivial” seems to be a possible — and  likely — source.  In contrast to what may be 
called “the Luce and Raiffa legacy”, a growing litterature asserts that coordination 
games, even pure ones, are not so trivial as they may appear at first glance.  
Moreover, they are fundamental in the sense that they help identify fundamental 
interaction problems (e.g., interactive belief formation) and how such problems are 
resolved (e.g., through conventions).  Finally, coordination games are fundamental, 
not only in the sense that a host of everyday situations conform to their structure(s) 
(Schelling 1960, 1978), but also in the sense that from a theoretical perspective, 
problems of equilibrium selection, which may often be seen as coordination 
problems, are very common.15   
 Fundamentally, coordination games are (very often) non-trivial, because their 
multiplicity of equilibria serves to highlight the importance for outcomes of agents’ 
beliefs about each others’ beliefs.16 And such interactive epistemology can be quite 
complicated business, as both the philosophical (Lewis 1969; Dupuy 1989; Bicchieri 
1993; Gilbert 1992), theoretical (Rubinstein 1989; Bacharach 1993; Aumann and 
Brandenburger 1995; Sugden 1995; Colman 1998; Colman and Bacharach 1998) and 
experimental (Cooper et al. 1992, 1994; Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997; Colman 
and Stirk 1998) literatures confirm.   Thus, equilibrium selection theories have been 
devised for rationalizing certain outcomes rather than others in asymmetric 
coordination games (Harsanyi and Selten 1988); there is a body of work on how 
repeated play may lead to the convergence to an equilibrium (Crawford and Haller 
1990); work has been done on how players’ labelling of their strategies influence 
their beliefs (Sugden 1995); and there is a literature on communication in 
coordination games (Farrell 1987; Rabin 1990)  ⎯ all of which is far from being 
trivial.  
 Moreover, coordination games are fundamental in a number of ways, first of 
all, in the basic phenomenological sense of being pervasive in social life (Schelling 
1960, 1978).  Second, they provide a useful conceptualization of one class of 
interaction situations that may lead to the emergence of social institutions (Calvert 
1995; Young 1996) or organizational phenomena (Camerer and Knez 1994, 1996, 
1997).  Moreover, they are fundamental in a theoretical sense, too, since recent 
                                                 
14  In contrast, philosophers have taken an interest for a long time (Lewis 1969; Gilbert 1992). 
15 Calvert (1995) makes similar points and concludes that ”… a well-developed theory of 
coordination games is necessary … to help us understand the emergence or design of institutions, 
and the conduct and maintenance of nearly any institution to foster cooperative behavior” (p.243). 
16 This does not mean that issues of belief dynamics, etc. are necessarily neglected in cooperation 
games, namely if these are repeated.  However, belief dynamics certainly are neglected in the 
conventional one-shot games with standard preferences, since no beliefs will lead to cooperation. 
(Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point).   One  may perhaps say that the basic question 
in cooperation games rather has to do with preferences (do players like to cooperate? Is this 
particular player a “sucker” or will he defect? Etc. (cf. Camerer and Knez 1996). 
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work in game theory has revealed that coordination problems (that may be 
represented in terms of coordination games) emerge in a multiplicity of game 
situations.  In particular, this is the case as dynamics is introduced, the number of 
players is increased, and less knowledge is ascribed to players.   
Types of Coordination Problems 
 A possible categorization of coordination problems that may be illustrated by 
means of coordination games lies is the following distinction between three broad 
classes of coordination problems:   
1) the problem of coordinating on an equilibrium when agents are initially outside 
equilibrium (i.e., have inconsistent beliefs, lack of common knowledge), and 
don’t know, for example, how strategegies are labelled;  
2) the problem of coordinating on one equilibrium out of a multitude, when 
strategies, pay-offs, and rationality are common knowledge (e.g., the battle of 
the sexes game); and 
3) the problem of moving from an inferior equilibrium to the efficient equilibrium, 
when strategies, pay-offs, and rationality are common knowledge (e.g., the 
assurance game).17    
What is common to all these three problems is that belief dynamics is essential to 
them.  They are briefly considered seriatim. 
 Coordinating on an equilibrium. This is the problem of rationalizing the 
formation of those beliefs that will make it possible for agents to realize some 
equilibrium.  To be sure, there has been an increasing interest in defining equilibria 
in terms of the beliefs and conjectures of agents, for example, in connection with 
interpreting the notion of mixed strategies (where the relevant probabilities are 
interpreted as subjectively held probabilities) (Aumann and Brandenburger 1995).  
However, the problem of actually rationalizing the emergence of equilibrium 
beliefs ⎯ rather than “simply” providing conditions for these ⎯ has attracted less 
general interest, 18 as least until recently.19
 Thus, in a much-cited paper, Crawford and Haller (1990) study how fully 
strategic agents may learn to coordinate in the context of a repeated coordination 
game where they initially have no shared information about how the strategies are 
                                                 
17 The main difference between 2) and 3) is that, first, in 3) the players are supposed to somehow 
have got stuck in the inferior equilibrium whereas in 2) they haven’t commenced play, and, second, 
that 3) rules out pay-off equivalent equilibria. 
18 For example, in Aumann and Brandenburger’s (1995) reformulation of the epistemic conditions 
for Nash equilibrium, players are assumed to know the conjectures of other players.  As Mailath 
(1998: 1351n) observes, this assumption “… does not appear to be a significant improvement over 
the original assumption of Nash behavior.” 
19 Of course, various evolutionary and semi-evolutionary approaches which portray players as 
adjusting stage-game strategies across iterations as responses to the observed behavior of other 
players have been around for a long time.  However, the present paper does not consider this body 
of work, because of the rationalist orientation of the paper. 
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labeled or how the game is presented (e.g., the normal form of the game) and 
where strategies are symmetric (i.e., yield the same pay-offs) and where the players 
are also symmetric in the sense that they are in identical strategic positions in the 
game.  Although they are playing the same game, they may (and likely, will) 
perceive it differently.  This effectively excludes any focal points based on the 
description of the game.  However, after some play, the players will develop 
distinctions between strategies and players, and when these distinctions become 
common knowledge, coordination may take place very quickly.  The assumption 
that puts in motion, as it were, the right belief dynamics that establishes common 
knowledge is that players follow the meta-strategy of repeating successful 
strategies. 
 Of course, one should be extremely cautious in drawing inferences from the 
very simplified setting of Crawford and Haller (1990) to more complicated (and 
realistic) settings, where the problem of reaching an equilibrium may be 
complicated by, for example, the imperfection as guides to future behavior of 
precedents generated in earlier play when players play against different other 
players (Knez 1998).  However, one important feature of the Crawford and Haller 
analysis lies in their demonstration that in the situations they analyze, “ … it is 
sometimes optimal to forsake an efficient strategy forever in favor of an inefficient 
one that is less costly to locate” (1990: 584).  In other words, although coordination 
sometimes take place quickly, there is no guarantee that agents coordinate in an 
efficient manner.     
 Selecting among multiple equilibria.  It is well-known that prisoners’ 
dilemma games with many players or hidden information imply many different 
ways of motivating cooperation, and that a key problem is making players choose 
beliefs that will pick out one of these solutions (Calvert 1995: 242).  However, 
somewhat in contrast to the situation analyzed in Crawford and Haller (1990), 
there may be a coordination problem, even in the presence of common knowledge.  
The conventional illustration of this is the symmetric pure coordination game, such 
as game 1a in Figure 1. 
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 1 here XXXXXXXX 
The problem is that classical game theory is not terribly helpful with respect to 
telling us how players will avoid coordination failure in such situations.  Of course, 
when a (one-shot) game has multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies, it often has 
a unique mixed strategy equilibrium (Nash 1951). But the basic problem of 
rationalizing the beliefs that lead players to play mixed strategies, and choose 
certain probabilities (and believe that others choose certain probabilities) rather 
than other ones is not really addressed.  There is still a fundamental problem of 
rationalizing the formation of equilibrating beliefs.   In one interpretation of Nash 
equilibrium ⎯ namely, that it is the outcome of non-binding preplay 
communication leading to the selection of a self-enforcing agreement (Farrell 1987) 
⎯ the problem can, of course, be handled.  It is arguably outside the conventional 
interpretation of games in normal form, such as the one in matrix 1, where the 
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players make their choices simultaneously and there is no explicitly modeled stage 
in which they can communicate.  However, in an exploratory paper such as the 
present one, we wish to allow for this possibility, too.  
 Moving away from an inferior equilibrium.  The simultaneous move 
assurance game (matrix 1b) has become a popular pedagogical device for 
illustrating coordination failures, and it is one of the work horses of the 
experimental game theorist (e.g., van Huyck et al. 1990; Cooper et al. 1988, 1992).  
Of course, this is motivated by the game’s ability to portray risky coordination and 
strategic complementarity.  Relatedly, the game connects to the theoretical issue of 
equilibrium selection in situations in which the existing refinement procedures do 
not work.  For example, Harsanyi and Selten (1988) forcefully argue that the pay-
off dominant outcome ((2,2) in matrix 1b) is a natural focal point.  However, there 
is experimental evidence that coordination failure “almost always” occur (in the 
absence of pre-play communication) (van Huyck et al. 1990; Cooper et al. 1992).   
 Perhaps less obviously, rationalizing the pay-off dominant outcome as the 
focal point in the apparently less risky asymmetric pure coordination game (matrix  
1c) is far from trivial (Farrell 1988; Colman 1997; Colman and Bacharach 1997).  The 
basic problem is that A appears to have no rational grounds for choosing the 2 
strategy in lieu of grounds for believing that B will choose the 2 strategy, because if 
A would choose the 1 strategy, B would do better by also choosing the 1 strategy.  
Of course, B is in the same epistemic situation, and the reasoning process winds up 
in infinite regress.  Pre-play communication does not necessarily help, for how can 
one player be sure that the other player understood him?  There still seems to be a 
problem of justifying beliefs.  So how can we justify everybody’s strong intuition − 
that the pay-off dominant outcome will in fact be chosen? 
 In a recent paper, Colman and Bacharach (1997) suggest that players may 
solve the problem by using something they call the “Stackelberg heuristic”.  
Essentially, this heuristic works by letting agents mentally transform a normal 
form game to an extensive form game.  Thus, they know that they will choose 
simultaneously but think as if they will choose sequentially.  Specifically, player A 
will simulate the game by thinking of himself as moving first.  Then B has to move 
with knowledge of A’s choice, choosing a best reply meta-strategy, namely 
strategy 1 if A also chooses 1 and strategy 2 if A also chooses 2.  Of course, the 
latter choice is best for A.  Having performed this simulation, A, returning to the 
real game, chooses what is (in the mental simulation) the utility maximizing 
strategy provided that B responds with a best reply (namely strategy 2).  Player B, 
performing the same simulation makes the same choice.  However, the 
requirement for the Stackelberg heuristic to do its work is that these simulations 
are common knowledge, in other words, that the heuristic itself is common 
knowledge. 
Summing Up and Looking Ahead 
 The preceding pages have established that coordination games are non-trivial 
and fundamental.  They are extremely helpful mental laboratories that assist in 
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exploring the boundaries of game theory (e.g., Harsanyi and Selten 1988; Colman 
and Bacharach 1997; Young 1996), and for providing indirect rationales for 
phenomena, such as conventions (Lewis 1969; Young 1996) and other social 
phenomena that somehow turns on the issue of belief dynamics. The suggestion 
that will be developed in the following pages is that coordination games are also 
helpful for understanding the cognitive aspects of leadership, that is, what Barnard 
(1938) referred to as “the inculcation of belief in the real existence of a common 
purpose.”20  The argument is not different in kind from other arguments pertaining 
to how coordination problems are solved in reality, namely through the effect on 
the beliefs that players hold of communication, the formation of conventions, etc.21  
Thus, leadership is an important member of the set of “alternative institutions for 
resolving coordination problems” (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross 1994). 
However, the argument is, if one likes, ”comparative-institutional,” in the sense 
that it is claimed that leadership may, in certain situations, be a low-cost alternative 
to these other methods of coordination.   
 
 4. Leadership  
Conceptualizing Leadership 
 In much of the organization theory literature, it is held that the essence of 
organization is coordinated response to volatility, for example, in technologies or 
preferences (Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1973).  Obviously, management and 
leadership have key roles here, for some volatility cannot be handled by 
organizational routine but requires judgment and decision.   As we have seen, the 
economics of organization, to the extent that it relates to leadership and 
management issues, is not taken up with managers’ and leaders’ concrete actions 
and the judgments that inform such actions.22  However, it surely is informative 
with respect to the leader and manager’s roles in the design of explicit and implicit 
contracts (Kreps 1990a; Miller 1992; Rotemberg and Saloner 1993; Hermalin 1998), 
and much of the nature of leadership and managerial work may be conceptualized 
in this way.  Thus, a classic contribution on the nature of managerial work 
(Mintzberg 1973: 5) lists six 
... basic reasons why organizations need managers: 1. The prime 
purpose of the manager is to ensure that his organization serves its basic 
purpose ... 2. The manager must design and maintain the stability of his 
organization’s operations ... 3. The manager must take charge of his 
organization’s strategy-making system, and therein adapt his 
                                                 
20 I shall neglect various problems of weakness of will, the control of procastination, etc. as bases for 
understanding leadership and management (these are treated by, for example, Rumelt 1995). 
21 Notably, Camerer and Knez (1996) suggested that TQM programs (and per implication other 
management fads) may derive much of their effect from their functioning as focal points.  
22 In the words of Loasby (1995: 474), it does not tell us “… how Jones should decide what to do at 
nine o’clock on Monday morning.”   
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organization in a controlled way to its changing environment ... 4. The 
manager must ensure that his organization serves the ends of those 
persons who control it ... 5.  The manager must serve as the key 
informational link between his organization and its environment ... 6. As 
formal authority, the manager is responsible for the operating of his 
organization’s status system. 
On the face of it, much of this sounds largely consistent with the basic thrust of the 
economics of organization: It is indeed possible to cast virtually all of the above six 
points in terms of monitoring and the design of implicit and explicit contracts.  
 However, if one reads Mintzberg’s own further detailing of what the six 
points actually mean and imply, it turns out that an economics of organization 
conceptualization does not do full justice to them.  For Mintzberg is clear that the 
production of “values” and “atmosphere” through “directing”, disseminating 
information, and acting as “spokesman”, “negotiator”, and “figurehead” are what 
lies behind the above managerial roles.  Such roles and functions have so far not 
been treated  from the perspective of the mainstream economics of organization. 
 The symbolic and cognitive aspects that Mintzberg associate with 
management become even more pronounced if one turns to the large and diverse 
literature on leadership in organizations (e.g., Vecchio 1997; Conger and Canungo 
1998).  Here, the leader is seen as engaging in numerous activities, such as 
planning strategy, changing standard practice, creating vision and meaning for the 
organization, and inducing changes in values, attitudes and behavior.   The reason 
why the economics literature on leadership may look somewhat meager (if 
considerably more precise) relative to the richness in the leadership literature 
arguably turns on the difficulty of providing economic interpretations of the 
cognitive and entrepreneurial aspects of leadership in particular.  Of course, the 
aim should not be to present the phenomenon in all its complexity, but it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that economic approaches to leadership miss some essential 
aspects of the phenomenon, particularly those relating the the cognitive 
dimensions.  
  In the following, I shall suggest that the basic ideas on coordination games 
that have been discussed so far are helpful for understanding precisely those 
aspects of leadership.  More specifically, I shall develop a notion of leadership as 
the taking of actions that coordinate the complementary actions of many people 
through the creation of knowledge (or belief) conditions that at least approximate 
common knowledge, and where these actions characteristically consists of some act 
of communication directed at those being led.  
Beliefs and Coordination Problems 
 An example of the type of belief dynamics that I am taken up with here 
involves the crucial epistemic construction in H.C. Andersen’s well-known fairy 
tale, ”The Emperor’s New Clothes” that knowledge hold may be held identically 
(i.e., everybody knows that x is the case), but not in common.  The child’s loud 
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announcement that the emperor really isn’t wearing any clothes creates the belief 
dynamics that transforms the situation from one in which everybody knows that 
the emperor is not wearing any clothes to the situation in which everybody knows 
this and knows that everybody else knows it.  The transformation essentially works 
because something else is common knowledge, namely that everybody knows that 
everybody knows what the child exclaimed.  
 One, possibly farfetched, interpretation of the situation described in the tale is 
that a sort of assurance game is involved: Everybody would prefer that the truth be 
told, but because pay-offs (and possibly also rationality) are not common 
knowledge, telling the truth is risky (scorn may be heaped upon you!).   Only the 
”mediation” of the non-calculative child allows for beliefs to be coordinated on the 
superior equilibrium.  In his classic contribution, Schelling (1960) explicitly linked 
what he called ”mediators” to coordination problems:  
… a mediator can do more than simply constrain communications – 
putting limits on the order of offers, counter-offers, and so forth – since 
he can invent contextual material of his own and make potent 
suggestions.  That is, he can influence … expectations on his own 
initiative … When there is no apparent point for agreement, he can 
create one by his power to make a dramatic suggestion. 
In other words, when “Schelling competence” ⎯ that is, players’ capacity to 
coordinate by means of focal points (Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997: 2) ⎯ is low 
coordination by means of a “dramatic suggestion” may be required.  Although 
Schelling doesn’t spell this out, we may suggest that the creation of common 
knowledge conditions is what is involved in his notion of mediation.  A first hint, 
then, derived from Andersen and Schelling, is that part of the leader’s function 
may be the break-up of an epistemic stalemate through acts of communication that 
influence “in the right way” the beliefs held by players.23
Coordination and Communication 
 The formalization (Crawford and Sobel 1982; Farrell 1988; Rabin 1990) and 
empirical investigation (Cooper et al. 1989, 1992, 1994) of communication is a 
relatively recent undertaking in game theoy. Thus, Cooper et al. (1992) 
experimentally evaluated the effect of “cheap talk” under one-way communication 
and under two-way communication in the context of an assurance game. They 
found that with no communication, coordination failure was universal (the 
efficient equilibrium was never reached), with one-way communication 
                                                 
23 This is akin to Farrell’s (1988) discussion of pre-play communication in connection with 
coordination games, and his introduction of a “speaker,” that is, an agent who “... can make a 
suggestion about what players should do in the second stage [after communication].  A suggestion is 
a list specifying, for each player i, a non-empty subset Ti of i’s (mixed) strategy space Si.  We can 
interpret this as a ‘speech’ proposing (precisely or vaguely) how everyone should behave in G [the 
second stage game].  If this speech is credible, we want to assume that everyone believes it; this is 
the link between words and action” (p.210-11). 
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coordination substantially improved (the efficient equilibrium was reached about 
50 % of the times), and two-way communication almost completely eliminated any 
coordination failures.   
 Intuitively, things are even simpler in pure, symmetric coordination games 
(Rabin 1990), where one would expect one-way communication to be more 
successful than in the context of assurance games.  Thus, one person’s 
communicative act may create a focal point that becomes common knowledge, 
such as the child’s announcement in the H.C. Andersen fairy tale.  But there is an 
apparent difficulty here (Monderer and Samet 1989).  For whereas it was implicitly 
assumed in the discussion above that a public announcement automatically 
becomes common knowledge, it is not at all obvious that such an assumption is 
always warranted, particularly as the group to which a message is directed grows 
in size.  For example, there may be a probability, however small, that somebody in 
the group was absent-minded at the time of the announcement, which effectively 
means that the announced message will not be common knowledge.   
 In a famous note, Rubinstein (1989) pointed out that whether or not common 
knowledge obtains may matter dramatically for outcomes.  In his “electronic mail 
game” example, nature chooses one of two two-person, risky coordination games 
with equal probabilities. If the state of nature is common knowledge, coordinating 
on the desired equilibrium is taken by Rubinstein to be straightforward.  Not so if 
what Rubinstein calls “almost common knowledge” obtains, that is, if only a finite 
(but possibly very large) number of propositions of the sort “1 knows that 2 knows 
that A knows ... that the state x (a or b) obtains” are true.  Effectively, this situation 
implies that the game becomes one of incomplete information, although the 
players are allowed to communicate.   
 In the example, the first player knows which one of the two games will be 
played and he sends a message to the second player, informing him about this.  
The second player acknowledges receipt of the message, player 1 acknowledges 
receipt of the acknowledgment, and so on.  However, there is a small probability 
that a message gets lost in the process, in which case the process of communication 
is brought to a halt.  The problem now is that neither of the players know whether 
it was his message or the other player’s acknowledgment that was lost. Rubinstein 
proves that the uncertainty caused by incomplete information implies that under 
almost common knowledge, there is actually only one Nash equilibrium in the 
game.  Thus, there is no “convergence” to the common knowledge situation, where 
the players will play a certain strategy if state a obtains and the other strategy if 
state b obtains.  Clearly, the agents would have been better of if some mechanism 
could somehow throw a condition of common knowledge into their game.  
 It is of course easy to construct an argument that because we, strictly 
speaking, can never be absolutely certain that something is common knowledge, 
many potential Pareto improvements are never realized.  Some may even argue 
that common knowledge is a useless fiction.  However, in a stimulating paper 
Monderer and Samet (1989) argued that common knowledge can be approximated 
(in a way they make precise) by the notion of common belief.  Using Aumann’s 
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(1976) model, in which knowledge is partitions and beliefs are posterior 
probabilities, belief may be defined as being “common” in the conventional way, 
namely when an infinite hierarchy obtains. The difference is that beliefs are held 
with a probability, such that a common ρ-belief may be defined for each ρ in [0,1].  
Monderer and Samet then show that when ρ approaches 1, common ρ-belief 
approximates common knowledge.24 This line of reasoning further suggests, if only 
loosely, that not only are agents’ success at coordinating their strategies dependent 
on the beliefs they hold about each others’ beliefs, but that the more well-founded 
these beliefs are, the better they are able to coordinate strategies.  This brings us 
directly to leadership, for one role of leadership is to influence how well founded 
agents think certain beliefs are.  
Leadership and Coordination  
 For the purposes of this paper, leadership has been defined as the taking of 
actions that coordinate the complementary actions of many people through the 
creation of belief conditions that (at least) substitute for common knowledge, and 
where these actions characteristically consists of some act of communication 
directed at those being led.   It is time to make something more out of this tentative 
definition. 
 Why may  coordination problems cause a need for leadership in the above 
sense?  In order to get a take on this issue, it is convenient to make a distinction 
between coordination problems (represented by means of coordination games) in 
which common knowledge (or, at least a common ρ-belief where ρ is close to 1) 
about pay-offs and strategies obtains initially and those in which it does not.  
Moreover, it is convenient to make a distinction between games where agents can 
communicate by exchanging cheap talk (at no or low cost) and those in which they 
can’t (or communication is very costly).25  However, the leader will be privileged 
by being the only player who can always communicate if he so chooses.  These 
distinctions produce four cases in which leadership plays different roles (table 1).  
They are considered seriatiam. 
XXXXXXXX Insert Table 1 here XXXXXXXX 
 Case 1 represents the case where leadership is least likely to play a role, since 
knowledge is common and agents may communicate at low or no cost. If 
communication costs are strictly 0, coordination will be instantaneous.  However, 
with positive (if small) communication costs, delay is a possibility.  For example, 
the relevant game may be a pure symmetric coordination game without any focal 
points (e.g., matrix 1a).  In this situation, agents want to delay decisions because 
they first want to communicate with other agents.  The incentives for delay are 
caused by the complementarity of actions that implies gains from coordination.  
                                                 
24 But see Shin and Williamson (1996) for some examples where no amount of common belief (short 
of the maximum) will do as a substitute for common knowledge. 
25  Implicitly, the cost of communication dimension captures group size. 
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These incentives may, however, cause an inefficiency, since there is no social gain 
from delay (Gale 1995).   In this situation, the exercise of leadership, that is, the 
picking of some strategy, may economize on delay and communication costs.  
 Case 2 differs from case 1 by not allowing agents to engage in communication.  
However, the common knowledge assumption is maintained. As we have seen, 
there is substantial empirical evidence that agents may not choose the effficient 
equilibrium when they cannot communicate, for example, in assurance game 
situations (e.g., matrix 1b), although the have full common knowledge about pay-
offs, strategies, and rationality.   In this situation, the leader may, by playing the 
efficient equilibrium and making this common knowledge, induce the other player 
to play the efficient equilibrium.   
 Moreover, agents may have difficulties coordinating on an equilibrium, when 
their “Schelling competence” is low (i.e., there are no obvious focal points), or they 
have to go through complex and costly reasoning processes á la the Stackelberg 
heuristic of Colman and Bacharach (1997), or they have to invest in flexibility (i.e., 
choose several actions at the same time by incurring some costs – see Galesloot and 
Goyal 1997) in order to reach their preferred equilibrium.  Through the signal 
provided by the leader picking some strategy, these coordination problems may be 
resolved. 
 Case 3 refers to the situation where knowledge is not held in common, but 
where agents may communicate at no or low cost.  If communication costs are 
strictly 0, one would expect common knowledge conditions to be established 
instaneously, and coordination follows in the same split second.  However, if 
communication costs are positive, but small, there may still be a role for leadership, 
particularly with respect to convincing players that there are gains from 
coordination. 
 Case 4 refers to the situation where knowledge is not held in common, and 
where agents cannot communicate (at reasonable cost).  Although theoretically 
extreme, this is also the most realistic of the four cases.   The real world of managers 
and leaders is not a world of simple two-strategies, two-players coordination games 
with costless cheap talk and common knowledge, but rather large-scale games with, 
imperfect recall, state-contingent uncertainty, etc.  In this situation, players are likely 
to have incomplete information (or none at all) about other players, available 
strategies, previous plays, etc., and games will have to be re-defined and played anew 
(Calvert 1995).  In a large-scale game, individual belief formation may at most 
proceed from extrapolating the current aggregate behavior of the population.26   There 
is not likely to be an exact (if any) correspondence between players, strategies and 
outcomes in various “repetitions” of “the game”. There will likely be multiple 
equilibria.  In such a situation, leadership may be conceptualized as picking one 
equilibrium out of a multiplicity (Calvert 1992), for example, by establishing belief 
conditions that approximate common knowledge. 
                                                 
26 Van Huyck et al.’s (1990, 1991) results clearly indicate that group size is important in determining 
the long run coordination outcome. 
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 To be more specific about how leadership works by influencing beliefs in the 
absence of common knowledge, consider Colman and Bacharach’s (1997) work on 
“the Stackelberg heuristic,” which was mentioned earlier.  In their work, no player 
is, strictly speaking, a leader; the Stackelberg element is introduced by thinking of 
oneself as a Stackelberg leader.  However, we may find room for more genuine 
leadership if we provide a realistic interpretation of the fundamental assumption in 
the model that any conclusion about which strategy to play reached by player A 
will be perfectly anticipated by player B, and vice versa (i.e., is common 
knowledge).  This may make sense for small groups characterized by a long time of 
interaction (Camerer and Knez 1994).   But in larger scale settings with less of a 
history of interaction, players may not have such an easy time performing the 
Stackelberg heuristic.27 In such situations, it may make sense to condition one’s 
strategy choices on the choices of one particular player – who will be, in a sense, a 
leader.  
 Another example relates to the electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989). 
Organizational phenomena that are akin to the electronic mail game may be 
represented by problems of coordinating in an administrative hierarchy: If senior 
management’s strategic plan calls for new initiatives if certain conditions obtain 
and these new initiatives require inter-departmental coordination, what should 
division managers do (Rumelt 1995)? Moving first may be costly, but 
communication regarding concerted action will not lead to common knowledge. 
Top-management may circumvent these problems simply by ordering all division 
managers to show up at a particular place and date, communicate their new 
initiatives and make sure that all division managers publicly and explicitly agree 
on coordinating their actions.  This may help establishing the required condition of 
common knowledge (or an approximation in terms of common beliefs).28
 To sum up on the above, leadership may be thought of in terms of remedying 
1) problems of coordinating on an equilibrium when agents are initially outside 
equilibrium; 2) problems of coordinating on one equilibrium out of a multitude; 
and 3) problems of moving from an inferior equilibrium to the efficient equilibrium 
by influencing the beliefs that agents hold.  The question then arises how the leader 
accomplishes this and what motivates his followers to follow him.  
Leadership, Knowledge, and Communication  
 The story that has been sketched in the preceding pages relies heavily on the 
notion of common knowledge (or at least common ρ-belief with a high ρ).  
However, it has already been noted that common knowledge may be an unrealistic 
                                                 
27 Also, the Stackelberg heuristic will obviously not be helpful to players that are caught in 
symmetric coordination games. 
28 Polanyi (1958) provides a further illustration of the link between belief dynamics and leadership. 
As he points out (1958: 224), submitting to leadership may itself be a coordination problem: ”If, in a 
group of men each believes that all the others will obey the commands of a person claiming to be 
their common superior, all will obey this person as their superior … [A]ll are forced to obey by the 
mere supposition of the others’ continued obedience, without any voluntary support being given to 
the superior by any member of the group.” 
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assumption, because we, strictly speaking, can never be absolutely certain that 
something is common knowledge.  One may conclude that in interaction we will 
always suffer from the inefficiencies illustrated by Rubinstein’s (1989) electronic 
mail game.  However, such a conclusion is premature.   
 One interpretation of the notion of common knowledge is to not actually 
think of it as involving conscious ever-ascending processes of reasoning, but rather 
as something that players recognize heuristically, somewhat akin to Monderer and 
Samet’s (1989) notion of common ρ-belief.  For example, if players have a long 
history of interaction, this may be sufficient to allow them to shortcut the infinite 
processes of reasoning involved in the common knowledge assumption.  For 
example, from the observed body language of the other players or through eye 
contact, etc., they may conclude on the basis of their earlier history of interaction 
that common knowledge is being formed (or, ρ is approaching 1). They simply 
know.  Hence, the importance of face to face contact in the examples with which I 
began this paper.  Other social practices in firms ⎯ notably various kinds of social 
gatherings in which management typically insists that a substantial part of 
employees be present ⎯ may play a similar role: They are mechanisms for 
installing common knowledge among employees.  For example, they may help to 
build up the “precedents” (Knez 1998) that Kreps’ (1990) analyzes as an important 
part of corporate culture, and which means that all employees know that 
everybody knows that in situations of type x, the thing to do is y.29     
Judgment, Motivation and Commitment 
 So far, I have tacitly assumed that the leader is a sort of benevolent deus ex 
machina, who spots and resolves coordination problems to the benefit of all 
concerned.  This raises a number of problems that so far have been sidestepped.  
The first problem relates to the informational advantage of leaders, the second 
relates to the leader’s motivation for leading, and the third relates to how he 
secures that those he wants to lead actually follow him.  
 With respect to the first issue, Hermalin (1998) begins his analysis by 
assuming that the leader already has some informational advantage. The ability to 
glimpse or intuitively judge what is the “true” structure of a situation (say, an 
ongoing battle) and take action on the basis of that judgment is a common 
interpretation (perhaps rather definition) of successful leadership. It is, however, 
not clear that traditional social science has much to contribute to the understanding 
of the cognitive and psychological issues of what makes the leader’s judgment 
superior to other players’ judgment or, conversely, why leaders sometimes fail in 
their judgment of a situation.30  However, it is certainly possible to address a 
number of issues that are connected to the exercise of judgment, such as the 
                                                 
29  In turn, this suggests that leadership and a well-established corporate culture may be substitutes 
with respect to the solution to certain coordination problems. However, there may also be 
complementary relations between them, as, for example, a strong corporate culture may ease the 
exercise of leadership, and leadership may help to build up corporate culture. 
30  Although psychology-based behavioral research may be helpful here. 
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consequences of the exercise of judgment and the motivation of leaders and 
followers.  
 With respect to the motivation of the leader we may well make standard 
assumptions with respect to his behavior.  As portrayed so far, the leader’s 
activities create additional utility for the relevant players by; by making players 
change their strategies, he moves them towards better equilibria.  He can be paid 
out of this extra value, or, if he is one of the players in the game himself, we will 
automatically gain from his activities (supposing the relevant games are 
coordination games such as those in matrices 1a-1c).  
 With respect to the issue of how to motivate followers to actually follow, 
things are slightly more complicated.  As discussed so far, leadership consists in 
influencing beliefs so that better equilibria can be reached, for example, through 
explicit (speech acts) and more tacit (body language) communication and through 
“leading by example” by being the first to pick a certain strategy.  That the issues 
of communication and commitment are closed linked has often been pointed out.  
Thus, Kotter, an expert on leadership, argues that  “… people will not make 
sacrifices … unless they think that the potential benefits of change are attractive 
and unless they really believe that transformation is possible. Without credible 
communication, and a lot of it, employees’ minds and hearts are never captured” 
(Kotter 1996: 9). In the way that Kotter uses the concept here, “credible 
communication” corresponds closely to the point that leaders may be instrumental 
in installing common knowledge conditions among players. Thus, if everybody 
believe that everybody else will move to a superior equilibrium when such as 
change has been communicated by the leader, and if it is common knowledge that 
players condition their behavior on the leader and that the leader himself gains by 
the change, then the leader’s communication is very credible indeed.   To put in 
simpler terms, in pure coordination games, we would clearly expect “cheap talk” 
to be credible, since it is clearly in the interest of the announcing player to follow 
what he himself announces.  
Application and Evidence? 
 The primary aim of this paper has been to put forward a conceptualization of 
leadership that while based on simple game theoretical ideas can capture much of 
what is meant by leadership from a cognitive or symbolic perspective, and goes 
some way towards rationalizing such a notion.  The ideas here should first and 
foremost be judged relative to how well they make sense out of cognitive and 
symbolic understandings of leadership, and of existing business practice. 
 With respect to the latter issue, Camerer and Knez (1996) have suggested that 
Total Quality Management may play a role akin to the role that this paper has 
ascribed to leadership, namely to help establish focal points that ease coordination 
of actions.  Kreps (1990) argue much the same with respect to corporate culture.  
That perspective may be generalized, drawing on the ideas of this paper.  Thus, the 
currently highly fashionable emphasis on “knowledge management” may be 
interpreted as an attempt to create knowledge conditions among employees that 
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approximate common knowledge.  In such an interpretation the practice of 
knowledge management ⎯ which may roughly be interpreted as a practice of 
disseminating and sharing knowledge that was hitherto more asymmetrically 
distributed ⎯ is useful, not because it disseminates valuable knowledge per se, but 
rather because the process of knowledge management is a vehicle for establishing 
knowledge conditions that more closely resemble those of common knowledge.  
Thus, knowledge-intensive organizations engage in knowledge management 
projects, not (just) because this allows for more efficient use of the knowledge that 
is available to the organization, but because these firms typically have a 
coordination need (e.g., because employees are hard-to-monitor professionals, 
organization structures are flat) that cannot easily be resolved by means of existing 
hierarchical mechanisms.  Establishing common knowledge conditions helps here.  
A similar argument may be applied to the emphasis in some quarters of the 
strategy literature on “vision” (e.g., Prahalad and Hamel 1994).   Thus, the value of 
vision may lie not so much in its entrepreneurship (i.e., identifying new business 
opportunities), but rather in the contribution to the establishment of common 
knowledge conditions that a simple and effectively communicated vision may 
bring.  
 Existing experimental evidence to has a bearing, directly or indirectly, under 
the issues under consideration here.  For example, it is a rather robust result that 
coordination on the efficient equilibrium in weakest-link games is virtually 
impossible for groups the size of 10 persons or more (Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil 
1990; Camerer and Knez 1994).  Of course, this doesn’t prove the need for 
leadership, but it does suggest that various institutions, and among them 
leadership, exist for the purpose of building assurance.  One device that for a wide 
class of games improves coordination ⎯ both in theory and in experiments ⎯ is 
communication (Farrell 1987, 1988; Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross 1989, 1992, 
1994), and communication and leadership has indeed been connected in this paper.   
 However, there is reason to be cautious here, for communication is not 
always helpful.  Thus, Weber, Camerer, Rottenstreich and Knez (1998) conducted 
experiments with weakest-link games and found that letting one member of a large 
group partake of the role of a speaker and engage in brief one-way, pre-play 
communication did not improve the success with which the group coordinated.  It 
may of course be objected that weakest-link games are extreme games (they are 
very risky) in a broad class of coordination games and that the experimental 
subjects that were picked as speaker/leaders were inexperienced students, not real 
managers. However, the results of Weber et al. (1998) do indicate that 
communication is not necessarily effective across the board and that in some 
interaction situations, communicative leadership will have to be backed up with 
other means that can further build assurance (cf. Kotter 1996).  
 Moreover, recent experimental work has begun to discern some basic 
mistakes that leaders may be prone to committing. Thus, Weber (1998) investigated 
the dependence of successful coordination in weakest-link games (generalized 
assurance games) on the size of the group that played the game. His results 
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indicate that starting with small groups and then “growing” them at a slow rate 
(corresponding to “controlled growth” in firms) led to successful coordination in 
large group, whereas successful coordination was impossible if the size of the 
group was initially large.   Weber then allowed for the possibility that one of the 
players may become a “leader” in the sense that he is allowed to determine the 
growth path of group size.  The experiments suggest that leaders tend to increase 
group size too quickly.  In other words, they tend to not have the correct cognition 
of the situation.  Again, the easy objection is the same as above ⎯ that is, weakest-
link games are extreme games in the broad class of coordination games and the 
experimental subjects are inexperienced students ⎯ but the result certainly do 
indicate the potential importance of behavioral aspects for the understanding of 
leadership (cf. also Heath, Knez and Camerer 1993).    
 
 6. Conclusions 
This paper has had an explorative, yet ambitious agenda.  On the overall level, it 
has been suggested — following the lead of Camerer and Knez (1994, 1996, 1997) 
— that coordination games carry important lessons for the study of organizational 
phenomena, including leadership in organizations. The innovation of the present 
paper is to suggest and sketch a notion of leadership that links up with cognitive 
notions of leadership ⎯ in which the ”inculcation of beliefs” is central ⎯, but 
which is founded on a rational choice methodology and draws upon simple ideas 
in game theory.  Thus, the paper suggests that leadership is an important member 
of the set of institutions for resolving coordination problems; it is closely connected 
to issues of communication; it may arise as a response to significant 
communication costs in large-scale groups; leadership functions partly through 
communication; and leadership partakes of its coordinative role by establishing 
common knowledge conditions (or, belief conditions approximating this).  
 The aim of the present paper has primarily been to take the first step of 
conceptualizing the leadership phenomenon in a way that while linking up with 
importants strands in the leadership literatur is founded on rational choice 
methodology.   In a field that is characterized by so much diversity and lack of 
clarity with respect to the nature of leadership, clear conceptualizations are crucial.  
However, much more work is required to refine the notion of leadership in this 
paper, understand its reach, and go beyond definition and conceptualization to 
precise propositions.  Moreover, empirical work is clearly needed to obtain a better 
understanding of the situations where leadership in the sense defined in this paper 
may be less helpful (perhaps large-scale weakest-link games) and those where it 
performs a distinctly useful function. 
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 Table 1 
The role of leadership under alternative assumptions 
 about common knowledge and communication 
 




Case 1: Leadership may economize on delay and 








Case 2: Leadership may be required when “Schelling 
competence” is low, and/or there is coordination failure 
because agents avoid the risky, but efficient equilibrium; 
and/or agents have to go through complex and costly 
reasoning processes in order to reach their preferred 
equilibrium.  E.g., leaders may “build assurance” in 




Case 3: Leadership economizes on the communication 
costs of establishing common knowledge conditions. E.g., 
the leader may help convincing players that there are 















Case 4: Leadership helps establishing common knowledge 
conditions by influencing beliefs, or chooses one 
equilibrium out of a multiplicity.  
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Figure 1: Coordination games
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